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ABSTRACT
The definition of authorization under the Stored
Communications Act raises questions about implied
authorization in situations where someone fails to secure an
email account properly. The few cases that have addressed
this issue under the federal act or its state equivalents have
not created a bright-line rule. Instead, the question of
authorization has been highly fact-dependent. Two leading
interpretive theories have emerged on the question of
authorization: the code-based theory and the trespass theory.
While the code-based interpretation of authorization seems
pleasing because it appears to provide highly predictive
outcomes, it fails in some circumstances. This failure is
especially obvious when someone inadvertently and
unintentionally gives someone else permanent access to an
email account by, for instance, saving their username and
password in the browser of a shared computer. Courts
interpreting cases in this context implicitly reject the codebased interpretation of authorization, which would provide
no remedy, in favor of the trespass theory. Ultimately, the
code-based model does not provide enough flexibility to fit all
situations in which the courts wish to provide a remedy. The
best test, therefore, involves aspects of both theories.
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INTRODUCTION
At a time where anything and everything is done online, and
when our computer, phone, or tablet can store all of our private email
accounts and passwords, when do we implicitly grant someone else
authorization to access that information? The question is not as clearcut as some would like to think. There are two models of interpreting
the ultimate question of what constitutes authorization under the
federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA”): the code-based theory
and the trespass theory. The code-based theory relies on whether the
user bypasses code-based protections of the computer or system,
whereas the trespass theory analogizes to trespass law to determine
implied authorization. Depending on the facts of the case, the
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outcome may necessarily be different depending on which model is
used. While the code-based theory is growing in popularity, it fails to
provide a remedy in all cases where society and the courts appear to
see the need for one. In those circumstances, the courts implicitly
reject the code-based interpretation in favor of the more fluid trespass
model, often leaving the ultimate determination of implied
authorization to the jury.
I. BACKGROUND
As technology developed, privacy protection laws needed to as
well. A wiretap statute that only penalized voice interception proved
inadequate once communications started becoming electronic and
digital.1 Further, courts lacked guidance as to what extent common
law protections extended to electronic communications. Recognizing
these problems, Congress passed the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (“ECPA”) in 1986.2 This Act expanded the Wiretap Act
to include the “interception” of electronic communications.3 Congress
also recognized that electronic communications are not always in
transit; service providers also place them in temporary storage.4 The
ECPA, therefore, included the Stored Communications Act to protect
communications in electronic storage.5
A. The Stored Communications Act
Congress passed the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) to
extend privacy protections to electronic communications stored on a
server that provides email or other electronic communication
service.6 The Act provides that whoever “(1) intentionally accesses
1

See United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)
(recognizing that the Wiretap Act only applies where there is “aural acquisition of
the contents” of a message).
2
See generally, H.R. REP. NO. 99-647 (1986); Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848.
3
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2008), with Wiretap Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90351, Title III, § 802, 82 Stat. 213.
4
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22 (1968).
5
Id.
6
See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
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without authorization a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an
authorization to access that facility . . . shall be punished . . . .”7
The classic problem Congress designed the SCA to address is
when an individual hacks into an email provider and reads another
individual’s emails. As one departs from the archetypal example,
however, the analysis becomes more complicated. This Article does
not attempt to answer the ultimate question of when a person can and
cannot implicitly have authorization. Instead, this Article attempts to
demonstrate the highly fact-dependent nature of the inquiry.
B. Civil Cause of Action
The SCA provides for a civil cause of action, which allows
persons who are “aggrieved” by the violation of the SCA to recover
damages from the violator.8 Notably, the civil cause of action requires
a lesser mens rea: from intentional to either “knowing or
intentional.”9 The SCA also guarantees a minimum of a $1,000
recovery, grants the court power to award the prevailing party costs
and attorney’s fees, and allows for the possibility of punitive damages
if the conduct was “willful or intentional.”10
C. State Statutes
Certain states have adopted comparable statutes to the SCA.11 For
example, New Jersey expanded its Wiretap Act to include language
equivalent to that of the federal SCA.12While New Jersey’s version
has a different grammatical structure than its federal counterpart, the
7

18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2002).
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. § 2707(c).
11
The following is a non-exhaustive list of states that have some variation of
the SCA: Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See 1 ROBERT D. BROWNSTONE & TYLER G. NEWBY,
DATA SEC. & PRIVACY LAW § 9:47, at 1 n.1 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-27
(West 2013).
12
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-27 (West 2013).
8
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phrasing and requirements are virtually identical.13 Further, New
Jersey’s version of the SCA also provides for a civil cause of action
for a violation by any person “aggrieved by any violation” of the
Act.14 Due to these similarities, it is not surprising that New Jersey
courts interpret the federal and state versions similarly, and they look
to federal precedent when questions arise as to the New Jersey Act’s
scope.15 Likewise, federal courts occasionally consider state decisions
on state equivalents to the SCA.16
II. COURTS APPLY TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF AUTHORIZATION
Authorization is, by its very nature, a fact-specific inquiry. Even
in the single context of email, several different factual variants arise
requiring different approaches and interpretations. Courts use one of
two predominant theories to determine whether a person accessed the
communications with authorization.17 The first, code-based
interpretation is growing in popularity but does not provide enough
versatility to the courts to meet the varied situations where a remedy
is appropriate. The trespass model is, in comparison, much more
versatile but makes predicting outcomes more challenging.
A. The Code-Based Interpretation is Narrow in Scope
The code-based approach, at its most basic, prohibits access
where a person “bypasses [the] code-based protections designed to
limit his use of the computer system.”18 This happens commonly
13

Compare id., with 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2002).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-32 (West 1993).
15
See White v. White, 344 N.J. Super. 211, 218–22 (2001) (recognizing the
similarities between the SCA and New Jersey’s Act and applying federal precedent
to interpret New Jersey’s Act).
16
See, e.g., Lazette v. Kulmatycki, 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 754 (N.D. Ohio 2013)
(considering and distinguishing two state cases).
17
The concept of authorization is not limited to the SCA. The Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008) (“CFAA”), also deals with the issue.
Courts interpret authorization the same under both acts. See Theofel v. Farey–
Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (referring to discussion of authorization
under SCA when considering authorization under CFAA).
18
Katherine Mesenbring Field, Comment, Agency, Code, or Contract:
14
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when someone determines the password using a password-cracking
computer program, but also covers others situations, such as where a
person hacks around a password barrier or other security device, or
uses social engineering to trick someone into disclosing their
password to the hacker.19 Though this approach covers a wide swath
of activity, it is still narrow in that only limited types of conduct
constitute code-based violations.
One reason for using this approach is clarity. Another is that it
limits the number of situations that would constitute a violation of the
SCA. Recognizing that statutes like the SCA impose criminal
liability, some argue that the rule of lenity20 should apply to require
this narrow interpretation of authorization.21 Therefore, this method
of understanding authorization limits liability to when someone
explicitly tricks a computer system or uses deceit to induce a human
into giving more information or privileges than the person otherwise
would have.22
B. The Trespass Theory is a More Fluid Model
Another, more fluid theory of interpreting authorization involves
linking violations to the tort of trespass. This theory operates mainly
by analogy between trespass law and computer systems.23 In Theofel,
the court found a violation of the SCA when a company sought to
execute a clearly invalid subpoena on an email provider.24 After
recognizing that the SCA serves a comparable role to the tort of
Determining Employees' Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 825 (2009).
19
Id.
20
The Rule of Lenity requires that ambiguous laws imposing criminal liability
be interpreted in favor of the defendant when their ambiguity cannot be clarified
through traditional means of statutory interpretation. See Bell v. United States, 349
U.S. 81, 83–84 (1955).
21
See Warren Thomas, Comment, Lenity on Me: LVRC Holdings LLC v.
Brekka Points the Way Toward Defining Authorization and Solving the Split over
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 379 (2011) (arguing for
lenity to be applied in interpreting authorization under the CFAA).
22
Field, supra note 18, at 825.
23
See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey–Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2003).
Theofel is the leading and arguably first case to apply the trespass model.
24
See id. at 1074.
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trespass, the court examined a number of situations of trespass to
determine the question of mistaken authorization.25
The Theofel trespass theory is softer in the sense that it does not
have the rigidness of the code-based interpretation, which looks to
explicit conduct bypassing the computer protections. As such, it is
better able to capture situations where the code-based interpretation
fails to address society’s normative intuitions. It covers the situation,
for instance, when someone forgets to secure his or her system and an
intruder takes improper advantage of the situation to intrude on the
personal privacy of the computer’s owner.26
III. IMPLIED AUTHORIZATION IS MORE COMPLICATED THAN THE
CODE-BASED INTERPRETATION ALLOWS
Even within the restricted context of implied authorization to
access someone’s email, different factual scenarios yield different
results. Further, the courts do not always follow the code-based
interpretation, even when it would produce a definitive answer to the
question of authorization.
A. The Context in which an Email Account is Inadvertently Left
Open Demonstrates the Incompleteness of the Code-Based
Theory of Authorization
When someone inadvertently leaves an email account open, and
the next user of the computer stumbles across it, the second user does
not violate the SCA by looking at the emails.27 This result is obvious
under the code-based interpretation. Despite this fact, some courts do
not take the easy path by deciding the issue as a matter of law and
ultimately leave the question to the jury to answer as a matter of
25

See id. at 1072–73 (noting the distinction between a nosy neighbor who
deceives her way into a person’s home by posing as a meter reader and a wire-cop
who only conceals that he intends to repeat what he hears).
26
See Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass and
Privacy, 62 BUS. LAW. 1395, 1420 (2007) (arguing the insufficiency of the codebased model).
27
See, e.g., Marcus v. Rogers, A-2937-09T3, 2012 WL 2428046 (N.J. Super.
Ct. June 28, 2012); Doe v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 835 F. Supp. 2d 762, 767
(N.D. Cal. 2011).
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fact.28
In Marcus v. Rodgers, a school employee used a computer after
another employee who had not logged off of her email.29 The
subsequent user discovered the email inbox open on the screen and
then opened two emails where the email subject indicated that he was
discussed.30 While he did not have to do anything to see the inbox
contents, he did have to click on each of the two individual emails to
see their text.31 He eventually printed and disseminated the content of
the emails.32 Criminal charges were brought against Rodgers but
ultimately dismissed.33 Thereafter Marcus, the owner of the email
account, sued under New Jersey’s equivalent of the SCA.34 The trial
court denied a motion for summary judgment and let the issue go to a
jury.35 The jury found that Rodgers did not violate the act.36
On appeal, the court found that Marcus could not establish that
the defendant acted without authorization because she left her email
account open and accessible.37 The court noted that the defendant did
not circumvent a username or password but merely accessed what
was open and available to him.38 This analysis implies a code-based
approach to interpreting authorization.
However, the court did not close the door on further analysis
beyond the simple code-based inquiry. While the code-based
approach appeared to resolve the first question of whether the
defendant had authorization, the court looked further to whether the
defendant “knowingly exceeded his authorization.”39 As to this
second step, the court focused on the mens rea requirement:
“plaintiffs had to establish that [Rogers] knowingly exceeded his

28

Marcus, 2012 WL 2428046, at *5.
Id. at *1.
30
Id. at *1–2.
31
Id.
32
Id. at *1–3.
33
Id. at *3.
34
Id.
35
Id. at *1.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See id. at *5.
39
Id. (emphasis added).
29
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authorization.”40 The court held that whether he knowingly exceeded
his implied authorization was ultimately for the jury to determine.41
Leaving this question to the jury speaks to the fact-based nature of
this question and suggests that the code-based approach did not
resolve the question completely.
Similarly, in Doe v. City and County of San Francisco,42 the
plaintiff sued (under the Federal SCA) after her supervisor obtained
emails from her personal email account and tried to use them in a
disciplinary action.43 The plaintiff’s employer provided computers on
which the employees could check personal email.44 One of the
defendants printed twenty-eight of Doe’s emails.45 The defendants
claimed that Doe left these emails opened in minimized windows and
that one of the defendants discovered them upon using the computer
after Doe.46 Doe maintained that she did not leave these emails open
and that one of the defendants discovered them upon a search of her
email folders.47
Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court
denied, recognizing that there was a genuine issue of material fact
over how the defendants gained access to the emails.48 The jury
returned a verdict in favor of Doe.49 Defendants moved for a
judgment as a matter of law, which the court denied as to the SCA
claim.50 In denying the motion, the court recognized that the Ninth
Circuit applies the trespass framework.51 The court also reiterated that
there was a factual question as to how the defendants came by the
emails, i.e., whether they were left open or not, and expressed

40

Id. at *5–6.
See id.
42
835 F. Supp. 2d 762 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
43
Id. at 766.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 770.
49
Doe v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C10-04700 TEH, 2012 WL
2132398, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2012).
50
Id. at *3.
51
Id. at *2–3 (citing Theofel v. Farey–Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2003)).
41
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skepticism as to the defendants’ story.52
The juxtaposition of these two cases serves to highlight how
highly fact-dependent the outcomes of these cases are. While it is
important to note that these cases deal with different statutes in
different jurisdictions,53 both indicate the unwillingness of courts to
leave the question to the simple code-based approach. Ultimately, and
despite the simple answer under the code-based approach, both courts
left the question to the jury.
B. The Context of a Computer Shared Between Spouses
Demonstrates the Predictive Appeal of the Code-Based
Interpretation
Feuding spouses provide another context in which questions of
implied authorization arise. In these cases, the code-based model
seems applicable and largely outcome-determinative.
In White v. White,54 the wife hired a private agency to investigate
her husband for information that she could use to obtain a divorce.55
The agency looked at a computer that was for family use and found
that the husband had backed up all his emails on the hard drive.56 Not
knowing that the emails would be available without username or
password, he did not attempt to secure the emails.57 The wife’s
investigator copied the emails from the hard drive.58 In the resultant
custody proceeding, the husband moved to suppress the emails,
arguing that the private investigator accessed them in violation of
New Jersey’s version of the SCA.59
In denying the motion, the court briefly addressed the concept of
authorization. It stated, “‘without authorization’ means using a
computer from which one has been prohibited, or using another’s
52

Id.
Marcus applies the New Jersey equivalent to the SCA, while Doe applies the
federal SCA.
54
344 N.J. Super. Ct. 211 (2001).
55
Id. at 215–16.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 216.
58
Id. at 217.
59
Id. at 214–15.
53
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password or code without permission.”60 The court held that, because
the wife had authority to access the computer, she did not violate the
act.61
A different factual situation arose in Miller v. Meyers.62 In Miller,
the defendant was able to access his wife’s email account by
installing a “key-logger” program63 on a computer primarily used by
the wife and thereby obtained her email password.64 The court
granted summary judgment for the wife, finding no issue of material
fact.65
In this context, the code-based interpretation of authorization is
predictive. The Miller case demonstrates a code-based violation: the
husband installed a secret program on the computer to bypass the
code-based protections. When the court granted summary judgment
for the wife, it implicitly affirmed the code-based model. By contrast,
in White there was no code-based violation: the wife’s private
investigator merely stumbled upon saved emails. An attorney could
easily predict the outcomes for both of these cases if he or she were
assured that the courts would apply the code-based interpretation.
However, courts sometimes completely reject the code-based model
in favor of the trespass model, making accurate prediction
challenging.
C. Cases in which a Person Inadvertently Grants Permanent
Access to Someone Else Demonstrate Courts’ Unwillingness to
be Constrained by the Code-Based Model
A third context of implied authorization occurs when a person
inadvertently allows someone else access to his or her email system.
In this situation, repeated access may violate the SCA. In this
60

Id. at 221 (citing Sherman & Co. v. Salton Maxim Housewares, Inc., 94 F.
Supp. 2d 817 (E.D. Mich. 2000)).
61
Id. at 221.
62
766 F. Supp. 2d 919 (W.D. Ark. 2011).
63
A key-logger program is a program that, once installed, runs in the
background of a computer and records every key stroke made by a user. See Oxford
English Dictionary Online (Drft. Rev. Dec. 2012), http://www.oed.com (enter “keylogger”; then click “go”).
64
Miller, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
65
Id. at 923.
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scenario, courts may reject the code-based interpretation of
authorization in favor of the more fluid trespass theory.
In Lazette v. Kulmatycki,66 Verizon issued Lazette, an employee,
a BlackBerry for business and personal use.67 Verizon allowed the
employee to check her personal Gmail account on the BlackBerry.68
At the end of her employment, she returned the BlackBerry with all
her personal emails deleted but without disabling or removing the
Gmail account access.69 Subsequently, her supervisor used the
BlackBerry and continually monitored her personal email account
from it.70
Lazette sued, alleging a violation of the SCA.71 The defense filed
a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and argued that her failure to secure the
system deprived her of a claim under the SCA.72 The court declined
to dismiss, stating that “negligence [in failing to remove the account]
is, however, not the same as approval, much less authorization.”73
The court followed the trespass model, analogizing the situation to
someone who “fails to leave the door locked when going out” as
opposed to “one who leaves it open knowing someone [will] be
stopping by.”74
In another case, Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot
Camp,75 plaintiffs brought action against defendants for theft of
business model, violation of trademarks and copyrights, and
breaching fiduciary duties.76 Defendants moved to exclude from
evidence certain emails obtained in violation of the SCA.77 Mr. Fell,
owner of the defendant corporation, left his username and password
for his personal email account stored on his work computer, such that
it auto-filled when an employee of plaintiff corporation accessed the
66

949 F. Supp. 2d 748 (N.D. Ohio 2013).
Id. at 751.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 751.
72
Id. at 756.
73
Id. at 757.
74
Id.
75
587 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
76
Id. at 551.
77
Id.
67
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email account.78
The plaintiff79 argued that authorization was implied because Fell
left his username and password stored on the work computer.80 The
court applied the trespass model, likening plaintiff’s conduct to
leaving “a key to his house on the front desk [of the plaintiff’s
corporation]” and maintained that in such a situation, “one could not
reasonably argue that he was giving consent to whomever found the
key, to use it to enter his house and rummage through his
belongings.”81 The court held that there was no implied authorization
for plaintiff’s employees to access his personal email directly from
his Hotmail account and other accounts by using a password stored
on plaintiff’s computers.82
One final case does not involve inadvertence but express
permission. In Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams,83 two employees,
Adams and Young, exchanged their usernames and passwords so they
could access each other’s email and other work materials when one
was replacing the other as manager. After a couple of years, Adams
left the company.84 Though Adam’s own username and password
ceased to work once he left, he continued to access information on
the employer’s server using Young’s account information.85 He
ultimately obtained information that was proprietary in nature.86
The company eventually sued under, inter alia, the SCA. Both
sides moved for summary judgment. Despite the fact that Young
freely gave Adams his username and password, the court granted
judgment for the plaintiff, finding an SCA violation as a matter of
law.87 The court first noted that “[c]ommon sense should have been
sufficient to indicate to Adam that [his] behavior was wrong.”88 Then
the court applied the trespass model:
78

Id. at 552.
The plaintiff was the non-movant for the motion.
80
Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 559, 561.
81
Id. at 561.
82
Id. at 562.
83
582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 970 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 970–71.
86
Id. at 972.
87
Id. at 977.
88
Id.
79
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Drawing the analogy to trespassing, it is as if, two
years earlier, Young asked Adams to water the plants
in his office while he was on vacation and, for this
purpose only, Young gave Adams an extra key to his
office. Then, two years later, after Adams left the
company, Adams used the key to come back in the
office, snoop around, and take some of Young’s
work-related materials. Such conduct would clearly
be trespassing.89
The first two of these cases suggest that, when a person
inadvertently leaves another individual permanent access to his or her
password, he or she does not grant the other individual authorization
to access the email account. The final case suggests that inadvertence
may not even be required. In all three situations the courts
comfortably used an analogy, likening the situation to trespass law,
thereby applying the trespass theory of authorization. Additionally, in
all three cases the courts implicitly rejected the code-based analysis
by finding breach of the act for simply using the password someone
had access to. These cases demonstrate that the code-based approach
is insufficient. It does not provide a remedy in every situation where
society would expect one. The trespass theory is more fluid and can
fit these unusual cases. If Lazette, Pure Power Boot Camp, and
Cardinal Health are any indication, courts tend to abandon the codebased interpretation of authorization in situations where the codebased interpretation would not provide (from the court’s perspective)
an adequate remedy.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO AUTHORIZATION LOOKS TO
BOTH THE CODE-BASED AND TRESPASS THEORIES
It is important to note that the code-based and trespass approaches
to authorization are not mutually exclusive. The predictive benefit of
the code-based model can, at least in part, be utilized while still
allowing a more fluid trespass model to emerge and protect
individuals when needed. In fact, the best approach to determining
authorization would involve both approaches working in tandem. As
89

Id.
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a threshold inquiry, the courts should look to whether the defendant
bypassed any code-based protections. If the answer to that question is
yes then there is no need to examine trespass theories, as those
actions would amount to a violation as a matter of law.90 If the
answer is no then the court should still use the trespass model to see if
it indicates a violation. This second step is in accord with the court’s
examination of whether the defendant knowingly exceeded his or her
authorization.91 This question will often be left to the jury, as the
mens rea of “knowingly” is a material fact.
This combined approached is advantageous because it preserves
the best of both theories. The main benefit of the code-based
approach is its predictive nature and addressing the more clear-cut
case of hacking. Further, the advantage of the trespass model is its
fluid nature. If the code-based theory does not establish a violation,
the trespass model allows courts to address the normative issues that
the code-based theory does not fully capture.
CONCLUSION
The question of authorization under the SCA is complex and
largely fact-specific. The different interpretations of authorization
provide the courts tools for addressing these complications. The codebased theory of authorization, being the more popular of late, may
seem appealing at first because it is narrower in scope, incorporates
familiar concepts of lenity, and seemingly provides the ability to
predict outcomes. In some circumstances, however, the courts choose
to abandon the code-based theory where a different result seems
appropriate based on social norms. Thus, even when no code-based
violation seems apparent, as in Marcus, the trespass model permits
courts to leave the issue to the jury.92 There is no bright-line rule. The
strong predictive ability of the code-based model is valuable as one
measure of a trespass but is not the only measure. While picking the
lock of one’s back door makes for an easy case of trespass, walking
through the open front door may also be a trespass under the right
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See, e.g., Miller v. Meyers, 766 F. Supp. 2d 919 (W.D. Ark. 2011).
See, e.g., Marcus v. Rogers, A-2937-09T3, 2012 WL 2428046 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. June 28, 2012).
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See id. at *5.
91

236

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 10:3

facts. So too, in the computer trespass context, practitioners should be
aware that slightly distinguishable facts can create vastly different
outcomes. The best model would involve using aspects of both
approaches together. Thus, a court can get some of the predictive
ability of the code-based approach while still having the freedom to
find violations under analogies to trespass law when the facts and
societal norms demand it.

